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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 950380-CA 
v. : 
Priority No. 2 
DAX BRANT HAMMER, : 
Oral Argument Not Requested 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant-appellant Dax Brant Hammer appeals one of the conditions in his 
probation agreement, entered in lieu of a prison sentence upon his conviction for attempted 
burglary, a third degree felony under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-101, 76-4-102, 76-6-202 (1995). 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
and 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Although framed differently by appellant Hammer, the State respectfully 
submits that this case presents two issues: 
1. Did Hammer waive his appellate challenge to a probation condition calling 
for random, suspicionless searches of his person, property, and residence, by failing to object 
to the legality of that condition when his criminal sentence was imposed? The question of 
trial-level waiver is necessarily examined by the appellate court de novo upon the record, as is 
the question whether the appellant has established any exception to the rule that issues not 
raised in the trial court are waived on appeal. State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 
1994); State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922-26 & nn. 2-10 (Utah App. 1991). 
Only if Hammer prevails on the above issue may this Court reach the 
substantive issue on appeal: 
2. Can a probation agreement, entered in lieu of incarceration for a felony 
conviction, include a term requiring the defendant to permit suspicionless searches of his or 
her person, residence, and property? Just as a trial court has wide discretion to grant or deny 
probation, e.g., State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1990), State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 
1048, 1049 (Utah App. 1991), the crafting of a probation order to include certain conditions 
must similarly allow wide trial court discretion. The question whether that discretion includes 
authority to waive or restrict the defendant's Fourth Amendment protections is properly cast as 
a matter of law, upon which no deference is due to the trial court. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Hammer has disclaimed any independent analysis under article I, section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution. His argument on appeal thus involves only the similarly-worded Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Hammer was originally charged with second degree felony burglary, and 
misdemeanor theft. By plea bargain, he pleaded guilty to a single count of attempted burglary 
(dwelling), a third degree felony (R. 2, 12-15). The ensuing presentence report recommended 
that Hammer be placed on probation, including a condition that he "submit to random 
urinalysis and other tests of breath and bodily fluids to insure compliance with the terms and 
conditions of Probation Agreement" (R. 51 at (sealed presentence report, not released 
with record on appeal)). 
Hammer's standard Probation Agreement included the usual provisions for 
breath and bodily fluid tests, and for "reasonable suspicion"-based searches of "PERSON, 
RESIDENCE, VEHICLE or any other property under my control, without a warrant, at any 
time, day or night . . . " (R. 38, para. 6, copied in appendix I of this brief). The trial court, 
however, added "SPECIAL CONDITIONS" to the Probation Agreement, which Hammer 
signed: "D. Submit to random tests of breath or bodily fluids, and random searches of person 
and property" (id.; see also R. 43, also copied in appendix I ("shall submit to a search of his 
person, possessions, and residence upon request. . .")). Those amendments omitted any 
"reasonable suspicion" requirement; the trial court so informed Hammer at sentencing: "You 
will submit to random urinalysis and other testing of your breath and bodily fluids. And 
you'll submit to a search of your person, your premises or any property under your control or 
any vehicle under your control to determine whether or not you are using or possessing 
controlled substances or alcohol" (R. 59-60, also copied in appendix I). On appeal, Hammer 
challenges the inclusion of suspicionless searches as a condition of his probation. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A review of the facts, including events subsequent to the challenged sentence, 
lends support to the State's position in this case. It appears from the transcript of Hammer's 
29 March 1995 sentencing hearing (R. 54-63, copied in appendix I of this brief) that the trial 
court and the parties agreed that Hammer has a substance abuse problem that had apparently 
precipitated his crime (R. 56-58). Evidently impressed by Hammer's intelligence and 
"heritage," the court expressed its desire to assure that Hammer would not again go astray (R. 
58-59). Toward that end, the court imposed the special probation search condition, allowing 
suspicionless searches, of which Hammer now complains. 
On 18 April 1995, just eight days after he signed the Probation Agreement, 
Hammer was a guest in a friend's home that was the subject of a warrant-supported search. 
The warrant directed officers to search all persons present at the subject residence, and the 
search of Hammer revealed a controlled substance and paraphernalia. In his ensuing 
prosecution for possession of that contraband, before the same judge who had entered 
Hammer's probation order in this case, Hammer moved to suppress, challenging the warrant's 
validity. See State v. Hammer ("Hammer IF), Pet. for Interlocutory Review, No. 950437-
CA, filed in Utah Ct. App. 27 June 1995, at 1-3 (copied in appendix II of this brief). 
Although concerned about the warrant, the trial court denied Hammer's motion to suppress, 
relying upon the Probation Agreement to support the search of Hammer. However, the trial 
court characterized the Probation Agreement as only authorizing searches based upon 
"reasonable suspicion," and held that standard had been satisfied. Id. at 3 (and attachment, 
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interlocutory review of that suppression motion (Order copied in appendix II). Thus as far as 
the trial court is concerned, Hammer has been searched under the now-challenged Probation 
Agreement. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Hammer has waived his challenge to the suspicionless search probation 
condition, because he failed to object to it in the trial court. Nor has Hammer proven "plain 
error" or "exceptional circumstances" to justify relief from that waiver by default. On this 
basis, the suspicionless search provision should be summarily affirmed, without addressing the 
merits. 
2. If the merits can be reached, affirmance is appropriate. Hammer misrelies 
on the Utah Supreme Court's 1983 Velasquez decision under the Fourth Amendment, holding 
that probationer searches must be based upon reasonable suspicion, for two reasons. First, 
Velasquez does not address whether the "reasonable suspicion" requirement can be waived. 
By every indication, it can be waived, and it was voluntarily and knowingly waived by 
Hammer. Second, the Velasquez holding has been superseded by subsequent Fourth 
Amendment holdings from the United States Supreme Court. Under those decisions, and the 
"balancing" analysis articulated in the federal Supreme Court's 1995 Acton decision, 
suspicionless probationer searches are permissible. 
5 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
BY FAILING TO OBJECT TO THE SUSPICIONLESS 
SEARCH CONDITION OF HIS PROBATION, HAMMER HAS 
WAIVED THIS ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Hammer cannot overcome the threshold problem of waiver by default. He 
argues on appeal that as a matter of Fourth Amendment law, the trial court could not impose 
the suspicionless search condition of his Probation Agreement. But in the trial court, Hammer 
never objected to the suspicionless search condition. Indeed, he verbally acquiesced to the 
condition when the court informed him of it (R. 59-60, copied in appendix I). In the written 
Probation Agreement, executed later outside of court, Hammer again acknowledged that 
condition by initialling it and signing the Agreement (R. 38, also copied in appendix I). He 
therefore waived the issue by default (indeed, as set forth in Point Two of this brief, he 
affirmatively waived his protection from suspicionless searches). 
Now, on appeal, Hammer fails to demonstrate "plain error" or other 
"exceptional circumstances" that would justify excusing that waiver and reaching the merits of 
his Fourth Amendment argument. "It is well settled that, absent extraordinary circumstances 
or plain error, issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." U.S. Xpress, Inc. v. State 
Tax Comm'n, 886 P.2d 1115, 1119 (Utah App. 1994). Accord State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 
1113 (Utah 1994); State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922-26 & nn. 2-10 (Utah App. 1991). 
The waiver-by-default rule applies with equal force to issues overlooked in sentencing 
hearings. See State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 798, 801-02 (Utah 1990); State v. Bywater, 748 
P.2d 568, 569 (Utah 1987); State v. Rabbins, 733 P.2d 132 (Utah 1987) (per curiam). 
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Hammer, who acknowledges the waiver-by-default rule and even cites Archambeau (Br. of 
Appellant at 16), makes no attempt to articulate either exception to this rule. Instead, he 
alludes to habeas corpus as "the precious safeguard of personal liberty," and suggests, without 
explanation, that his defaulted claim could be raised in a habeas corpus petition, and therefore, 
should be entertained on direct appeal (Br. of Appellant at 16-17). 
That unsupported suggestion does not carry Hammer's appellate burden of 
proving an exception to the waiver rule. "This court has routinely declined to consider 
arguments which are not adequately briefed on appeal." State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 
(Utah App. 1992); accord State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984). To address 
Hammer's defaulted argument now, without proof of plain error or extraordinary 
circumstances, would violate the policy that underlies the waiver-by-default rule: "[T]he trial 
court should have the first opportunity to address the claim of error." State v. Dunn, 850 
P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993) (citing cases). Hammer never gave the trial court an opportunity 
to reconsider, and perhaps delete, the suspicionless search condition of his probation. 
That default would make it particularly unfair to the trial court, were this Court 
to consider the merits of Hammer's claim on appeal absent a powerful showing of exceptional 
circumstances or plain error. Hammer's prayer for relief asks this Court to "vacateQ and set 
aside" the suspicionless search provision of his Probation Agreement (Br. of Appellant at 17). 
Such relief would amount, in effect, to appellate editing of the trial court's considered 
judgment. Such editing would inappropriately divest the trial court of its traditional, broad 
discretion to decide whether a guilty defendant can be successfully supervised on probation, or 
should instead be committed to prison. See, e.g., State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1049 (Utah 
7 
App. 1991). Therefore, this Court should not address the merits of the Fourth Amendment 
issue raised by Hammer, and should summarily affirm the trial court's judgment. 
POINT TWO 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PERMITS RANDOM, 
SUSPICIONLESS SEARCHES AS A CONDITION OF 
PROBATION 
Were this Court to reach the merits of this appeal, Hammer could not prevail. 
Hammer argues that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution bars the 
provision for random, suspicionless searches from his Probation Agreement. He disavows any 
separate analysis under Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution (Br. of Appellant at 2 
n.l). Therefore, merits analysis proceeds solely under the Fourth Amendment. 
A. Utah Fourth Amendment Precedent: Velasquez 
Interpreting the Fourth Amendment in State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254 
(1983), the Utah Supreme Court held that warrantless searches of parolees are permissible 
when State officials have "reasonable grounds"--a standard less than probable cause-to believe 
that the parolee has violated parole or committed a crime. Id. at 1260 (the State equates 
"reasonable grounds" with the "reasonable suspicion" standard of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968), and its progeny). The court identified its holding as a "middle ground" position-
between demanding probable cause and requiring no cause for a parolee search. Subsequently, 
in State v. Martinez, 811 P.2d 205, 209-10 (Utah App. 1991), this Court extended the 
Velasquez "reasonable grounds" requirement to searches of probationers, whose liberty 
interests are limited to the same degree as those of parolees. Accord Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 
U.S. 868, 874 (1987) (equating parolees' and probationers' limited liberty interests). See also 
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State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1072 (Utah 1987) (following Velasquez); State v. Blackwell, 
809 P.2d 135, 136-39 (Utah App. 1991) (same). Thus Velasquez arguably supports Hammer's 
position on appeal. 
B. Knowing Waiver of Velasquez "Reasonable Suspicion" Requirement. 
However, in Velasquez, the Utah Supreme Court was not presented with, and 
hence did not reach, the question whether a convicted criminal, in order to receive probation 
in lieu of incarceration, may affirmatively waive his or her protection against any or all types 
of searches, whether or not supported by any level of suspicion. Perusal of other aspects of 
criminal law quickly reveals that such waiver is permissible. In entering guilty pleas, criminal 
defendants waive all their constitutional trial rights, along with virtually all right of appeal. 
See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(3) through -(e)(8); State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987). 
That the decision to plead guilty may be difficult, or later regretted, in no way affects the 
validity of such waivers. Defendants* who proceed to trial routinely cope with the dilemma 
whether to waive the right to remain silent, U.S. Const. Amend. V, and are required to live 
with the consequences of their decisions. Similarly, imposition of a probation condition that 
happens to be unpleasant or costly does not, ipso facto, operate to invalidate the condition. 
Cf. State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041, 1049 n.l (Utah App.) (separate opinion of Davis, J.) 
("While choosing probation over prison is nearly a Hobson's choice, it is nevertheless a choice 
offered at the discretion of the court"), cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994). 
Because Velasquez is silent about whether the "reasonable suspicion" 
requirement for probationer searches may be waived, this Court is free to hold that the 
requirement can be waived. Such holding would be consistent with State v. Hunter, 831 P.2d 
9 
1033 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992), in which this Court upheld a 
university dormitory room search that was authorized by the housing contract between the 
student-defendant and the university. Just as the student in that case agreed to limit his Fourth 
Amendment rights by valid contract, so too did Hammer contractually waive the "reasonable 
suspicion" limit on probationer searches, in return for the opportunity to receive probation, 
rather than face a prison term, for attempted burglary. 
This Court can then hold that Hammer knowingly and voluntarily agreed to that 
waiver, because the record readily supports such holding. Hammer signed the written 
Probation Agreement, initialling each of its conditions, including the special condition of 
random searches (R. 38, copied in appendix I). He was orally informed of that condition in 
open court, and stated his acceptance of it (R. 60, also copied in appendix I). Just as a written 
plea agreement and oral colloquy demonstrated a properly accepted, voluntary no-contest plea 
in State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 476-81 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 
1992), so too does the record in this case prove that Hammer knowingly and voluntarily 
waived his right, under Velasquez, to be searched only upon reasonable suspicion. 
C. Velasquez Overruled by Later U.S. Supreme Court Holdings. 
If this Court does not find a voluntary waiver of Hammer's rights under 
Velasquez, Hammer still cannot prevail. The "reasonable suspicion" limitation on probationer 
searches, established in Velasquez, is no longer valid. That limitation has been overruled sub 
silentio by subsequent United States Supreme Court cases interpreting the Fourth Amendment, 
which both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court are bound to follow. See State v. 
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1266 & n.9 (Utah 1993). Under the United States Supreme Court's 
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interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, Hammer's probation agreement properly requires 
him to submit to random, suspicionless searches of his person (including "bodily fluids"), 
residence, and property. 
1. "Special Needs" Searches and Probationers. 
The Supreme Court addressed probationer searches in Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 
U.S. 868 (1987), and upheld a warrantless search of a probationer's home that was carried out 
pursuant to a Wisconsin regulation that permitted such searches upon "reasonable grounds." 
483 U.S. at 870-71. The Wisconsin regulation was deemed constitutionally reasonable 
because of the "special need" to closely supervise probationers, and because probationers' 
privacy interests are less than those of the public at large. Id. at 873-75. "Special needs" 
exist when the governmental interest at stake is "beyond normal law enforcement," and 
therefore justifies departure from the warrant requirment. Id. The Court also found the 
challenged search reasonable "because it was carried out pursuant to a regulation that itself 
satisfies the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement under well-established 
principles." Id. at 873. Significantly, however, the Court in Griffin did not hold that the 
"reasonable grounds" requirement, contained within the Wisconsin regulation, was itself 
constitutionally required. See id. at 872 (declining to decide whether federal "reasonable 
grounds" standard must be met); id. at 875-76 (deferring definition of "reasonable grounds" to 
the Wisconsin state courts). Thus Griffin reserved the question whether a probationer search 
might be permissible without any level of individualized suspicion. 
That question is now answered affirmatively, if tacitly, by other Supreme Court 
decisions. Most recently and compellingly, in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 
11 
U.S. , 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995), the Court approved a public school district's policy of 
random urinalysis drug testing for student-athletes. Like probationer searches, the Supreme 
Court observed that public school searches serve "special needs." Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2391 
(citing Griffin). Canvassing its precedent, the Court further stated that "special needs" 
searches can be justified without any individualized suspicion: "[T]he Fourth Amendment 
imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion." Id. (quoting authority). The Court 
acknowledged other instances wherein suspicionless searches and seizures were held to be 
reasonable. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (roadblock sobriety 
checkpoints); Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (random drug testing of 
customs officers who are armed or involved in drug interdiction); Skinner v. Railway Labor 
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (drug testing of railroad personnel involved in train 
accidents); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (border checkpoints for 
illegal immigrants and contraband). See also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 555-60 (1979) 
(unnanounced cell searches, and post-jail visit body searches of pretrial detainees were 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment). Cf. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) 
(government employers may search employees' desks without probable cause); Camara v. 
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (administrative searches without probable cause). 
2. The "Reasonableness" Test for Special Needs Searches. 
In Acton, the Court also articulated the test for determining the reasonableness 
of "special needs" searches. Broadly described, such a search "is judged by balancing its 
intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the promotion of legitimate 
12 
governmental interests." Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2390 (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (in turn 
quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)). More specifically, this balancing 
analysis examines three factors: (1) the "nature of the privacy interest" upon which the search 
intrudes, Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2391; (2) the "character of the intrusion" upon that interest, id. 
at 2393; and (3) "the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern" raised to justify the 
search, and "the efficacy of this means for meeting it," id. at 2394. 
Notably absent from the foregoing balancing analysis is any reference to 
governmental regulations as benchmarks for Fourth Amendment protection. Thus while the 
content of a regulation can help a reviewing court to determine whether a "special needs" 
search is constitutional, as happened in Griffin, the existence vel non of regulations does not 
determine the scope of Fourth Amendment protection: after all, a policy or regulation could 
violate the Constitution. State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1138 (Utah 1994). Therefore, by 
invoking the probationer search regulations of the Utah Department of Corrections, which 
contain a "reasonable suspicion" requirement, Hammer gets the cart before the horse (Br. of 
Appellant at 10-14). While those regulations must obey Fourth Amendment law, they do not 
define that law. The Department's requirement of "reasonable suspicion" for probationer 
searches merely reflects its acceptance of the Utah Supreme Court's Velasquez decision as 
Fourth Amendment authority. That authority, however, is no longer good law. Instead, the 
balancing analysis set forth in Acton supports random, suspicionless probationer searches. 
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3. Reasonableness of Random Probationer Searches. 
Application of the federal Supreme Court's balancing analysis, with comparison 
to the Court's pertinent precedent, demonstrates that the Fourth Amendment permits 
suspicionless searches as a term of probation: 
Nature of the Privacy Interest 
It is clear that probationers have limited privacy interests. On this point, Utah 
courts are in accord with the United States Supreme Court: 
Probation is simply one point (or, more accurately, one set of points) on 
a continuum of possible punishments ranging for solitary confinement in 
a maximum-security facility to a few hours of mandatory community 
service. . . . To a greater or lesser degree, it is always true of 
probationers (as we have said it to be true of parolees) that they do not 
enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only . . . 
conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special 
[probation] restrictions. 
Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874 (citation and quotation omitted). Accord Velasquez, 672 P.2d at 1258 
(parolees have "diminished expection of privacy"); Martinez, 811 P.2d at 209-10 (same for 
probationers). 
And a criminal probationer, by definition guilty of a criminal offense, surely 
has no greater privacy interest than a public school student who desires to participate in sports, 
or a railroad employee unfortunate enough to be involved in an accident. Yet in Acton, the 
Supreme Court upheld suspicionless, random searches of student-athletes; in Skinner, drug 
screening of railroaders involved in accidents was approved. And if law enforcement officers 
may be subjected to random drug screening, as the Court held in Von Raab, surely adjudicated 
lawbreakers can expect no greater privacy. The privacy interests of pretrial detainees, not yet 
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convicted of any crime, yield to suspicionless searches under Bell v. Wolfish. Nor does a 
convicted criminal's interest in the privacy of his or her residence approach the "sanctity" 
level, Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980), accorded to the ordinary citizen: 
Griffin, after all, upheld the search of a probationer's home. 
It also appears proper to compare the privacy loss that would be inflicted upon a 
criminal who is imprisoned, rather than granted probation. Under Utah law, such a decision 
is left to the virtually unfettered discretion of sentencing courts. See, e.g., State v. Jameson, 
800 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1990). A prison setting, like a student-athlete's locker room, is 
surely "not for the bashful," Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2392, in terms of privacy loss: a prison 
typically is designed to allow inmate surveillance at all times-including sleeping, showering, 
and toileting. If a sentencing court can impose such a dramatic, chronic privacy deprivation 
upon a convicted criminal, it must have the discretion to impose a lesser deprivation-such as 
probation that includes random, suspicionless searches. Indeed, it seems a safe bet that most 
criminals, given the choice, would readily choose the latter situation over the former. As a 
matter of both precedent and logic, then, probationers such as Hammer have very limited 
"legitimate expectations of privacy." 
Character of the Intrusion 
The character of the intrusion caused by random probationer searches also 
supports their permissibility under the Fourth Amendment. For one thing, as just explained, 
the intrusion caused by an occasional random search is far less onerous than day-to-day life in 
prison. Cf. Morissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (a parolee's "condition is very 
different from that of confinement in a prison"); Velasquez, 672 P.2d at 1258 n.l (parolee 
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enjoys privacy rights not granted to prisoners). And as Hammer admits, probationers 
routinely live under a panoply of special expectations and restrictions: "The probationer's 
physical mobility and personal associations are restricted. He is required to provide a regular 
accounting which may include the status of his employment, schooling, mental health or 
substance abuse counselling or therapy, payment of fines and restitution, etc." (Br. of 
Appellant at 11). Hammer's Probation Agreement includes such requirements, plus a ban on 
firearms possession (waiving Second Amendment rights), a ban on alcohol consumption 
(normally legal for someone of Hammer's age, R. 3), and a requirement that he "pay a 
supervision fee" of $30 per month unless granted a waiver . . . " (R. 38, appendix I of this 
brief). Hammer does not contest the legitimacy of these restrictions. Compared to them, the 
occasional intrusion of a random, suspicionless search cannot amount, per se, to a 
constitutional violation. 
Yet this is not to say that the character of a particular probationer search might 
not be so harsh as to justify Fourth Amendment disapproval. It is now settled that even a 
warrant-supported search might be unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment's 
"reasonableness" clause. See Wilson v. Arkansas, U.S. , 115 S. Ct. 1914 (1995) 
("knock-and-announce" rule is part of reasonableness inquiry for warrant-supported search); 
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 560 ("The [pretrial detainee] searches must be conducted in a 
reasonable manner"); Velasquez, 672 P.2d at 1263 (searches may not be used to harass or 
intimidate). Cf. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (police may not use deadly force to 
seize suspect absent indication of immediate danger (due process analysis)). Thus there are 
inherent constitutional limitations on the manner in which state officials may conduct their 
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warrantless, suspicionless searches of probationer Hammer. To illustrate by extreme example, 
officials cannot hang Hammer by his heels, strip him naked in public, or tear down his home 
to conduct the searches authorized in his Probation Agreement: the manner in which they 
search him must be constitutionally reasonable. And by analogy to "scope-of-consent" 
analysis, a probationer search ought not exceed the scope of the probation agreement. But until 
and unless Hammer is subjected to such an unreasonable search (and no such situation is either 
alleged or apparent in this case), he has no Fourth Amendment complaint.1 
In fact, with respect to the "bodily fluids" searches, state officials have 
committed themselves to conducting such searches in a minimally intrusive manner. Under 
Corrections Department policy FEr21 (copied in Br. of Appellant addendum E), primarily 
designed for incarcerated inmates but adaptable to "Field Testing," FEr21/04.04, same-sex 
testers collect urine samples, taking measures to make the process as private as realistically 
possible. In Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2393-94, the Supreme Court noted similar privacy-protecting 
measures in holding that student-athlete drug screening was not unduly intrusive. 
It also bears note that Hammer has not been permanently deprived of his 
protection against warrantless, suspicionless searches. Like any probation agreement, 
Hammer's is of limited term-set by the trial court at thirty-six months (R. 42). Once that 
term has been successfully completed, all restrictions, including the searches, will end. In 
1Hammer includes an incompletely developed argument that his Probation Agreement 
does not consent to searches by persons other than his probation officers (Br. of Appellant at 
10). That argument is best deferred by this Court pending development on a more complete 
argument and trial court record-probably in Hammer II (described in the fact statement of this 
brief), if that case results in a conviction and appeal. 
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sum, the character of the intrusion is sufficiently limited to allow suspicionless probationer 
searches-both in general and in this case. 
Nature and Immediacy of State Concern; Efficacy 
Finally, the importance of the State's interest cannot be disputed. The Supreme 
Court described the interests served by rail worker searches and customs officer searches as 
"compelling." Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2394 (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628, and Von Raab, 
489 U.S. at 670). And in Griffin, the Court suggested, while reserving the question, that 
probationer searches might be justified simply on the basis that they serve "legitimate 
penological interests." 483 U.S. at 874 & n.2 (citing cases). In Velasquez, the Utah Supreme 
Court seemingly found powerful justifications for parolee searches: 
If the parole system is to be successful in achieving its objective of 
enabling a convict to leave a highly controlled prison environment and 
move to a point of less restraint and greater freedom in preparation for 
reentry into society, a parole officer needs to be able to act in a manner 
that could not be tolerated if done by a policeman or other agent of the 
state with respect to an ordinary citizen. 
Velasquez, 672 P.2d at 1259. The foregoing language emphasizes rehabilitation, a special 
goal of both parole and probation, and indicates that the State's interest in searches as a means 
toward that goal is a powerful one. Thus Hammer properly concedes that the State's interest 
in probationer searches is "legitimate" (Br. of Appellant at 8). 
Whatever level of governmental interest exists, or is required, to justify 
probationer searches, this much is clear: the interest advanced by suspicionless probationer 
searches is powerful. States, through their correctional authorities, are highly interested in 
utilizing probation as an effective rehabilitation and anti-recidivism tool. That interest is 
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surely as important as the goal of preventing student-athlete drug use. See Acton, slip op. at 
15 ("the nature of the concern is important-indeed, perhaps compelling . . . " ) . Cf. United 
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749 (1987) (the "government's interest in preventing crime 
by arrestees is both legitimate and compelling"). This, too, supports suspicionless searches as 
a probation condition.2 
And Utah citizens, like those throughout the nation, are highly concerned about 
crime, yet also concerned about the costs of incarceration. Crowded prisons and jails create 
pressures for alternative ways to effectively supervise convicted criminals, and therefore deter 
recidivism. In Utah, experiencing overall population growth, these pressures are increasing. 
Freedom from the "reasonable grounds" requirement for probationer and parolee searches will 
help to relieve those pressures. Probation and parole, as alternatives to incarceration, can be 
more readily ordered by sentencing courts upon assurance that the supervision of the criminals 
so sentenced will be intensive and liberally exercised. 
Turning to the efficacy question, Hammer admits that "the greater the intensity 
of the [probation] supervision, the greater the compliance with the terms of probation will 
likely be" (Br. of Appellant at 15). The truth of that proposition seems self-evident: a 
probationer's knowledge that he or she can be searched at any moment should provide a 
2Appellate courts in Illinois and Washington have held that the law enforcement need to 
effectively investigate future sex offenses justifies saliva and blood sampling of convicted sex 
offenders, in order to create and maintain a DNA-type database. People v. Wealer, 264 111. 
App. 3d 6, 201 111. Dec. 697, 636 N.E.2d 1129 (App. 2 Dist), review denied, 157 111. 2d 
519, 205 111. Dec. 182, 642 N.E.2d 1299 (1994); State v. Olivas, 122 Wash. 2d 73, 856 P.2d 
1076 (1993). These cases also discuss the "special needs" and "balancing" Fourth 
Amendment analysis utilized in this case. 
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powerful incentive to not just avoid the appearance of unlawful behavior, but to actually avoid 
such behavior altogether. Additionally, given the high cost of incarceration (state-provided 
shelter, food, supervision, medical care), the relative cost-effectiveness of intensive probation 
supervision, including random, suspicionless searches, has to be dramatic. Nor does it make 
good sense to render every probationer search subject to judicial review for "reasonable 
suspicion," as the Utah Supreme Court's Velasquez and Johnson holdings now require. That 
requirement forces probation officers to become versed in that elusive, often inconsistently-
defined term, detracting them from their primary duties of supervision and rehabilitation. See 
Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2396 (restricting student-athlete searches to individualized suspicion 
requirement distracts school personnel from their primary duties). 
And Hammer is mistaken in suggesting, by quoting Brine gar v. United States, 
380 U.S. 160, 180-81 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (Br. of Appellant at 15), that 
suspicionless probationer searches might be equated with the abuses of Nazi Germany. 
Intensive supervision of persons duly convicted of violating democratically-enacted laws 
simply does not compare to the executive fiat-based abuses of that era, directed against wholly 
innocent citizens. If a duly convicted criminal can be successfully supervised and rehabilitated 
by probation conditions that include random searches, that option cannot be regarded as 
"arbitrary," Brinegar, 380 U.S. at 180, and it should be available at sentencing. Limitation of 
supervisory ability, under the "reasonable grounds" requirement for probationer searches, will 
only chill trial court willingness to order probation rather than incarceration for offenders such 
as Hammer. 
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Finally, it bears remembering that Hammer, at sentencing, was recognized as a 
person with a drug abuse problem. Thus he had a history of surreptitious criminal behavior. 
The best way to monitor Hammer's success in ending that behavior, and arguably the best 
incentive for him to end it, was to subject him to random searches, just as the student-athletes 
in Acton were subjected to random testing. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 559 (body cavity 
searches viewed as effective deterrent to contraband smuggling); State v. Josephson, 125 Idaho 
119, 867 P.2d 993, 997 (Idaho App. 1993) (defendant's history of drug abuse supported 
Fourth Amendment waiver as condition of probation). On balance, then, and in line with 
federal Supreme Court authority, this Court should hold that suspicionless probationer 
searches are permissible under the Fourth Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
By virtue of the waiver explained in Point One of this brief, this Court should 
affirm the trial court's judgment, without necessity of oral argument. If the Court reaches the 
merits of this appeal, its should affirm for the reasons set forth in Point Two. In light of the 
potentially broad ramifications of a merits ruling on Point Two, however, oral argument 
would be appropriate. Under either point, the judgment should be AFFIRMED. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _^£_ day of November, 1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
J. KEVIN MURPHYVJ 
Assistant Attorney General 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX I 
DEPART W E ^ # QDRReCTIONS 
PROBAnO%*iRJcEMENT 951500040 00081991 
Case# OBSCIS # 
Fifth District Washington 
Court County 
I, P a x B r a n t Hammer , agree to be directed and supervised by Agents of the Department of Corrections and to be 
accountable for my actions and conduct to the Department of Corrections and the Court. 
I further agree to abide by all conditions of probation as ordered by the court and set forth in this Agreement, consistent with the laws of the 
state of Utah. I fully understand that violation of this agreement and/or any conditions thereof, or any new conviction for a crime, may result in 
action by the Court causing my probation to be revoked or my probation period to commence again. 
1. VISITS: 
2. REPORTING 
REQUIREMENTS: 
vn 
I will permit visits to my place of residence, my place of employment or elsewhere by Agents of Adult Probation and 
Parole for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the conditions of my Probation Agreement. 
I will not abscond from Probation Supervision. 
REPORTING: I will report as directed by the Department of Corrections. 
RESIDENCE: I will establish and reside at a residence of record and will not change my residence without 
first obtaining permission from my Probation Agent. 
LEAVING THE STATE: I will not leave the state of Utah, even briefly, or any other state to which I am 
released or transferred without prior written permission from my Probation Agent. 
jeportinq Instructions; 
T will report with in the first five working davs of each month and meet 
with my <aipprvising aggnt in person as well as providing a written report. 
3. CONDUCT: 
4. WEAPONS: 
5. CHEMICAL ANALYSIS: 
6. SEARCHES: 
7. ASSOCIATION: 
8. EMPLOYMENT: 
9. TRUTHFULNESS: 
10. SUPERVISION FEE: 
I will obey all State, Federal and Municipal laws. IF ARRESTED, CITED, or QUESTIONED by a peace officer, I will notify 
my Probation Agent within 48 hours. 
I will not possess, have under my control, in my custody or on the premises where I reside, any EXPLOSIVES, 
FIREARMS or DANGEROUS WEAPONS. (Dangerous weapon is defined as any item that in the manner of its use or 
intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.) Exceptions to this condition may be made by the 
supervising agent and must be in writing. This waiver will only apply to individuals on probation for a misdemeanor and 
who have never been convicted of a felony. 
I shall abstain from the illegal use, possession, control, delivery, production, manufacture or distribution of controlled 
substances (58-37-2 U.C.A.) and I will submit to tests of my BREATH or BODY FLUIDS to ensure compliance with my 
Probation Agreement. 
I will permit Agents of Adult Probation and Parole to search my PERSON, RESIDENCE, VEHICLE or any other property 
under my control, without a warrant, at any time, day or night, upon reasonable suspicion to ensure compliance with the 
conditions of my Probation Agreement. 
I will not knowingly associate with any person who is involved in CRIMINAL activity or who has been CONVICTED OF A 
FELONY without approval from my Probation Agent. 
Unless otherwise authorized by my Probation Agent, I will SEEK, OBTAIN and MAINTAIN verifiable, lawful, full-time 
employment (32 hours per week minimum) as approved by my Probation Agent. I will notify my Probation Agent of any 
change in my employment within 48 hours of the change. 
I will be cooperative, compliant and truthful in all my dealings with Adult Probation & Parole. 
I agree to pay a supervision fee of $30 per month unless granted a waiver by the Department under the provisions of 
Utah Statute 64-13-21. 
jail with credit for time served . ^ Maintain Full-Time Employment or Edu. 
11A SPECIAL CONDITIONS: 
\S[j^erve 66 days in 
plete a Substance Abuse Evaluation with SWIMi A/D and follow all recommendations. 
jtbmit to random tests of breath or bodily fluids, and random searches of person and property. 
EffiJot use or possess any alcohol or illegal drugs. yiyReport all perscriptions to APSP with in 
24 hours is issue.jflfc Pav a fine in the amount of 1,157.00 directly to the 5th District Court. 
I have read, understand and agree to be bound by this agreement. If I violate any of the conditions of this agreement, the Court may revoke my 
Probation or the Department of Corrections may take other appropriate action against me, and I hereby acknowledge receipt of a copy of this 
agreement. 
Dated this day of April AttS 
^ t)> finessed By: 
i . JL % 
Eric A. Ludlow #5104 
Washington County Attorney 
W. Brent Langston #4614 
Deputy Washington County Attorney 
178 North 200 East 
St. George, Utah 84770 
(801) 634-5723 
FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ] 
Plaintiff, J 
vs. ] 
DAX BRANT HAMMER, ) 
Defendant. 
• JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, STAY OF 
EXECUTION OF SENTENCE, ORDER 
I OF PROBATION, AND COMMITMENT 
) Criminal No. 951500040 
Judge: James L. Shumate 
The above-entitled matter having come on before the Court 
for Sentencing on the 29th day of March, 1995, and the Plaintiff 
being represented by W, Brent Langston, Deputy Washington County 
Attorney, and the Defendant, DAX BRANT HAMMER, being present and 
represented by Alan D. Boyack, and said Defendant having previously 
entered a guilty plea to the charge of ATTEMPTED BURGLARY, a 3rd 
Degree Felony, as charged in the Amended Information, and both 
counsel having stated that there was no reason why judgment should 
not be entered herein, the Defendant's Attorney having made 
recommendations to the Court regarding sentencing, and the 
Plaintiff's Attorney having made his recommendation, and the Court 
having received a Pre-sentence Investigation Report and the matter 
having been submitted; the Court being fully advised in the 
premises, now makes and enters the following: 
JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY FOUND, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the 
A ri 
m 
Defendant, DAX BRANT HAMMER, is guilty of ATTEMPTED BURGLARY, a 3rd 
Degree Felony, as charged in the Amended Information. 
SENTENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the 
Defendant, DAX BRANT HAMMER, is sentenced to serve a term not 
exceeding five (5) years in the Utah State Prison. 
STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
execution of the prison term imposed above, is stayed. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Defendant, DAX BRANT HAMMER, is placed on supervised probation for 
a period of thirty six (36) months, strictly within the following 
terms, provisions and conditions: 
1. That the Defendant shall forthwith make and execute a 
form of an agreement of probation as provided by the Utah State 
Department of Adult Probation and Parole, and shall strictly 
conform with all of the terms, provisions, and conditions thereof 
during the period of probation, and the same are hereby made a part 
of this Order by means of incorporation. 
2. That the Defendant shall report as ordered and 
required by this Court and by the Utah State Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole. 
3. That the Defendant shall commit no law violations. 
4. That the Defendant shall serve sixty six (66) days in 
the Washington County Jail, and shall receive credit for time 
previously served. 
5. That the Defendant shall pay a fine in the amount of 
2 
one thousand one hundred fifty seven dollars ($1,157.00), which 
includes an eight-five percent (85%) surcharge for victim 
reparation, pursuant to monthly payment schedule with Adult 
Probation and Parole. 
6. That the Defendant shall maintain full-time 
employment or school. 
7. That the Defendant shall obtain a substance abuse 
evaluation with Southwest Utah Mental Health, and if recommended, 
enter into, successfully complete, and pay for counseling. 
8. That the Defendant shall use no drugs. 
9. That the Defendant shall use no alcohol. 
10. That the Defendant shall report this conviction to 
any attending physician before receiving a prescription and if so, 
shall report the receipt of said prescription to Adult Probation 
and Parole within 48 hours. 
11. That the Defendant shall submit to a search of his 
person, possessions, and residence upon the request of his 
supervising agent of Adult Probation and Parole, peace officer, or 
any official of any program enrolled in, including submitting to a 
urinalysis or other tests for controlled substances and/or alcohol. 
COMMITMENT 
THE SHERIFF OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, State of Utah, is 
hereby commanded to commit the Defendant, DAX BRANT HAMMER, to the 
Washington County Jail, there to be kept and^g^efiwj§^ in accordance 
with the above Order. & V ..•••*... '- N^ 
A DATED this /L day of May, 
DISTRlte'^ VRf""jtj#!?£ .;. 
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THE COURT: Mr. Boyack, is this a good time to 
do the Hammer matter? To call it a little early? 
MR. BOYACK: I believe so. 
THE COURT: All right. Is the defendant here, 
or do you want to go get him? 
MR. LANGSTON: He's here. He's incarcerated. 
MR. BOYACK: I just ~ that's where I was. I 
was speaking to the defendant's mother. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. BOYACK: And we can proceed now. 
THE COURT: Do you want her to be here? She's 
not here. 
MR. BOYACK: I don't think it's necessary. I 
think we can proceed. 
THE COURT: All right. I intend to follow the 
recommendations. But if Mrs. Hammer wants to be here, I 
will certainly hold off. 
Let me call that matter, then. 951500040, State 
of Utah versus Dax Brant Hammer. 
Mr. Hammer, will you come down with your 
attorney, Mr. Boyack. 
This is the time and place set for sentencing in 
PAULG.MCMULLIN 
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this case. I have received the presentence report and find 
that it's a favorable recommendation. I intend to follow 
it. 
Anything else you want to say, Mr. Boyack? 
MR. BOYACK: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Hammer, is there anything you 
want to tell the Court before I impose sentence? 
MR. HAMMER: No. There's nothing. 
THE COURT: Mr. Langston, is there anything you 
want to add? 
MR. LANGSTON: Your Honor, in the plea 
agreement, we agreed to recommend that the defendant be 
granted a stay of imposition of sentence, and also that he 
receive counseling. We believe that he — it's a fact that 
he does need counseling for substance abuse problems and 
other problems that have happened in his life, and we 
believe that that should be ordered. That is part of 
the — it talks about an evaluation and — in paragraph 
number five of the recommendation. We certainly think that 
should be done. And then any counseling followed up on 
that. 
And we'll submit it on that basis. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Counsel. 
Anything else, Mr. Boyack? 
MR. BOYACK: Yes, Your Honor. I just want the 
PAULG.MCMULLIN 
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Court to know that I've had an opportunity to get to know 
Dax. When Dax didn't showf he voluntarily — he rushed 
himself back. And Dax and I have had some long talks about 
the substance abuse, and we keep talking about that — he 
seems to think it's a problem, and the State and perhaps 
the Court thinks that it's a problem. Dax may or may not 
be in denial. And I want to give him some benefit of the 
doubt in that if it was a problem, he's had a 
detoxification forcibly imposed upon him, and I think that 
from our talks in the jail facility that he knows and 
understand that he's subject to periodic testing. And — 
and so in a sense, he may have had the very best of a 
rehabilitation period during his incarceration period, and 
I hope that that might be enough. 
On the other hand, we don't want to forestall 
the counseling that's recommended. We think that's a good 
idea. I would simply state that if the Court has any 
reservations about Dax, at least he has detoxified, and I 
think has an excellent attitude now to proceed and go on 
with his life. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Hammer, it's the 
sentence of the Court that you be incarcerated in the Utah 
State Prison for a period of time not to exceed five 
years• 
I'm going to stay the imposition of any fine. 
PAULG.MCMULLIN 
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I'm going to stay the execution of the sentence. I'm 
afraid your days as a ski bum are over. 
MR. HAMMER: I think so. 
THE COURT: I think so too. Besides, the ski 
season is about over now anyway. 
Let me tell you the way it looks to those of us 
who have been involved in the system as long as Mr. Boyack 
and Mr. Langston and I have been involved. It looks like 
you were wandering around, didn't have much to do and 
suddenly saw a way to convert somebody else's property into 
cash for drugs. That's ordinarily the way it looks like. 
It may not be precisely that, but I want you to think about 
what it looks like to those of us who see a lot of these 
things. And that's the basis for the Court's order. 
First term of your probation. I'm going to 
place you on probation for 36 months and to serve 66 days 
in the Washington County Jail, with credit for time 
served. And you're getting out of the jail today. 
Next term of your probation — and I'm putting 
them in the order of importance to the Court — is that you 
maintain full-time, gainful, legitimate employment or 
education. 
Mr. Hammer, there's no reason in the world for 
you not to achieve a great deal in your life. You've got 
the brains; you've got the drive. Frankly, you've got the 
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heritage to do just about anything you want to do. So your 
days as a ski bun are over. At least for the next three 
years. If you want to go back to that life-style after 
that, I guess you could. But I think you'll find out that 
by the tine you get to be ny age, your body begins to give 
out on you, and being a ski bun doesn't work nuch any 
nore. It's not as nuch fun as it night be right now. And 
if you don't have sone training, sone background, sone 
profession, your life can be really enpty. And there's no 
reason for you to have an enpty life. 
Next tern of your probation is that I want you 
to subnit to a substance abuse evaluation through Southwest 
Mental Health and conply with all recommendations nade as a 
result of that evaluation. 
If they evaluate you and determine that you are 
not chemically dependent, then they won't nake any further 
recommendations. But if they do nake that determination — 
and I suspect they nay find — then I want you to deal with 
the problen now. Don't deal with it two and a half years 
fron now after you have been found in violation of your 
probation for using drugs that you couldn't get away from 
and have to go off to the prison. 
Any question about that tern? 
MR. HAMMER: No. Not really. 
THE COURT: Okay. You will subnit to random 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN 
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urinalysis and other testing of your breath and bodily 
fluids. And you'll submit to a search of your person, your 
premises or any property under your control or any vehicle 
under your control to determine whether or not you are 
using or possessing controlled substances or alcohol. You 
will not use alcohol or controlled substances during the 
term of your probation. You will report this offense to 
any doctor with whom you consult, and you will report any 
prescription that you get to Adult Probation and Parole 
within 24 hours. If you're at work and drop a brick on 
your foot, and you need a prescription, that's up to the 
doctor to make that decision. But I just don't want a drug 
test to come up positive, and everybody be surprised, 
because you forgot to report a prescription. So tell them 
of any drugs that you're taking under prescription. 
Any question about that one? 
MR. HAMMER: No, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. Now, you will pay a fine 
in the amount of $1,150 — 57. There's a $625 fine plus 
the 85 percent surcharge. 
You will be released from the jail. And I don't 
expect to see you back except to have this matter 
successfully completed at the end of your probation or such 
sooner time as you have satisfied Adult Probation and 
Parole that you're going to no longer involve yourself in 
PAULG.MCMULLIN 
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controlled substances or criminal conduct. 
Any questions? 
MR. HAMMER: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Good luck to you. 
You have the right to appeal any error of the 
Court in this proceeding. You have to file a notice of 
appeal within 30 days of today's date. If you wait any 
longer than that, you lose your chance. And you do that by 
filing a written notice of appeal with the clerk of the 
Court. 
Any questions about that, sir? 
MR. HAMMER: No. 
THE COURT: Good luck to you, sir. 
MR. HAMMER: I would like to know one thing. 
THE COURT: Yes, sir. 
MR. HAMMER: I did contact Gary Webb of 
Southwest Mental Health — whatever it is. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. HAMMER: And he did come and see me, and I 
did get money into the jail so I could get the evaluation. 
And he told me he'd show up the next morning, and he did 
not show up. 
THE COURT: Well, you'll be able to get at him 
yourself now. You can wait on his desk rather than wait on 
him to come to you. 
PAULG.MCMULLIN 
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Good luck to you. 
MR. HAMMER: All right. 
MR. BOYACK: Thank you, Your Honor, 
(Whereupon, the proceedings in the 
above-entitled matter were concluded.) 
PAULG.MCMULLIN 
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STATE OF UTAH 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
) SS. 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
I, PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR, an Official Court 
Reporter in and for the Fifth Judicial District, State of 
Utah, do hereby certify: 
That the foregoing natter, to wit, STATE OF UTAH 
VS. DAZ BRANT HAMMER, CRIMINAL NO. 951500040, was 
tape-recorded at the time and place therein named and 
thereafter, to the best of my listening and understanding, 
reduced to computerized transcription. 
I further testify that I am not interested in 
the event of the action. 
WITNESS my hand and seal this 6th day of July, 
1995. 
, yri'Vn^A^ 
PAUL G. IN, CSR, RPR 
RESIDING AT: St. George, Utah !~~ 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 3-17-99 * ') 
NOTA?N P l ' b U r 
PAL'LG MCMULLIK 
43^ Nnr*»- 5= Wes4 C«rc»e 
Mv Commissior ExD»f«s 
Ma'cn 17m 199& 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN 
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 
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APPENDIX II 
GARY W. PENDLETON (2564) 
Attorney for Defendant and Petitioner 
150 North 200 East, Suite 202 
St George, Utah 84770 
Ph: (801) 628-4411 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff and Respondent, ) PETITION FOR PERMISSION 
TO APPEAL INTERLOCUTORY 
vs. ) ORDER 
DAX BRANT HAMMER, ) Washington County Case No. 951500444 FS 
Case No. 
Defendant and Petitioner. ) 
1. Dax Brant Hammer (hereinafter "defendant"), through counsel, Gary W. 
Pendleton, petitions the Utah Court of Appeals to permit an appeal from an interlocutory 
order of the Honorable James L. Shumate, Fifth District Court, entered in this matter on 
June 26,1995. Specifically, defendant seeks permission to appeal the district court's order 
denying the defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence which the state intends to use 
in defendant's pending prosecution on a charge of POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE, a second degree felony. 
2. A photocopy of the order for which review is sought is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "A". The supporting findings and conclusions are included as part of the order. 
3. STATEMENT OF FACTS. In the early afternoon of April 18,1995, St 
George City police officers and Washington County Sheriffs deputies executed a search 
warrant at the residence of one Ray Adams in Santa Qara, Utah. The warrant ordered 
ATT0»N? 
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peace officers to search the residence "as well as all persons present during execution of the 
search warrant.11 Because defendant was visiting the Adams residence when police officers 
arrived, his person was also searched. 
Defendant was charged with POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE (methamphetamine within 1000 feet of a public park), a second degree 
felony, and POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA (within 1000 feet of a public 
park), a class A misdemeanor. Following preliminary hearing, the paraphernalia charge was 
dismissed and defendant was ordered to answer the controlled substance charge. 
Following arraignment, defendant moved the district court to quash the search 
warrant and suppress the state's physical evidence. Defendant claimed standing to attack 
the search warrant because the warrant was directed at him as someone who was "present 
during the execution of the search warrant.11 
Defendant contended that the police officer affiant who applied for the search 
warrant had, in an attempt to establish an undisclosed informant's reliability, falsely 
described the informant as "a citizen with no motive to fabricate and nothing to gain from 
providing this information." This undisclosed informant was one Kelly Moore. Moore was 
in fact presently facing criminal charges in three separate proceedings, one of which was a 
felony charge which was pending preliminary hearing. 
Defendant subpoenaed Moore to testify at the suppression hearing. Moore 
failed to comply with the subpoena. Defendant proceeded with the hearing as far as he 
could without Moore's testimony. The district court issued a bench warrant for Moore's 
arrest and continued the hearing. Although the hearing was ultimately continued three 
times, defendant was never able to compel Moore's attendance as a witness. 
Because defendant had not been able to secure pretrial release, defense 
2 
counsel finally asked the court to rule on defendant's motion to suppress based upon the 
testimony which the court had already heard. Counsel asked that in the event the court 
upheld the search warrant, defendant be allowed to revisit the issue when and if Moore's 
attendance as a witness could be compelled. 
The district court then, after expressing concern about the application for the 
search warrant but without deciding whether or not the warrant had been properly issued, 
denied defendant's motion to suppress for the following reasons: (1) Defendant had been 
recently convicted of Attempted Burglary, a third degree felony, and was on probation under 
the supervision of the office of Adult Probation and Parole; (2) Under the terms of the 
order of probation, defendant was obliged to submit to searches of any peace officer upon 
"reasonable suspicion11;1 and (3) Even if the affidavit supporting the issuance of the search 
warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause, the information set forth therein, was 
sufficient to establish "reasonable suspicion". 
The district court had indicated that in the event defendant were able to 
secure Moore's attendance, the court would hear additional evidence on the question of 
whether or not the search warrant had been properly issued. However, that issue has 
become academic in light of the district court's ruling that the search was legal without the 
warrant. 
Defendant has perfected a timely appeal from the judgment, sentence and 
order of probation entered upon his Attempted Burglaiy conviction. That appeal is 
presently pending before the court of appeals as Case No. 950380-CA The only issue on 
that appeal is the validity of the term of probation which requires the defendant to "submit 
Actually, the written order of probation contains no "reasonable suspicion* requirement 
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to a search of his person, possessions, and residence upon the request of . . . peace officer 
tt 
4. QUESTIONS OF LAW: 
(a) Was the defendant, by virtue of the order of probation entered as a result 
of his attempted burglary conviction, under a legal obligation to submit to a warrantless 
search by any peace officer? 
(b) Was the defendant, under said probation order, properly required to 
submit to warrantless searches for controlled substances? 
(c) Did the defendant, by accepting probation in the prior criminal proceeding, 
waive his Fourth Amendment rights? 
5. ISSUES RAISED IN TRIAL COURT: The precise legal issues presented 
for review by this proposed interlocutory appeal were fully and fairly presented to the district 
court and the district court ruled on each question presented. This is apparent from a 
review of the minute entries which are attached hereto as Exhibit TB". See Minute Entry, 
May 18, 1995, at pp. 2-3; Minute Entry, May 26, 1995, at p.2; and Minute Entry, May 31, 
1995, at pp. 1-2. 
Specifically, in the proceedings before the district court, defense counsel 
advanced the following arguments and cited the following authorities: 
(a) A probationer's Fourth Amendment rights may be curtailed by the court's 
probation order to the extent, but only to the extent, reasonably necessary to facilitate the 
administration of an effective system of probation. State v. Velasquez. 672 P.2d 1254 
(1983)(parole case). 
(b) A term of probation which modifies the probationer's Fourth Amendment 
rights must be reasonably related to the offense of which he was convicted. Sprague v. 
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State. 590 P.2d 410 (Alaska 1979)(burglary probationer not properly required to submit to 
warrantless searches for narcotics). 
(c) While the administration of an effective system of probation may require 
submission to warrantless searches by probation officers based upon nothing more than 
xeasonable suspicion, a probation order cannot properly require a probationer to submit to 
searches by any law enforcement officer. Elkins v. State, 388 So. 2d 1314 (FkuApp. D5 
1980); State v. Fields. 686 P.2d 1379 (Hawaii 1984). 
(d) A criminal defendant who, faced with a term of incarceration, accepts 
probation on condition that he waive his Fourth Amendment rights does not voluntarily 
waive his constitutional rights. Dearth v. State. 390 So.2d 108 (FlaApp. D4 1980). 
6. IMMEDIATE APPEAL NECESSARY: Unless the issues presented by this 
proposed interlocutory appeal are resolved prior to trial, defendant is in jeopardy of being 
convicted and incarcerated on the basis of evidence which was obtained in violation of his 
fundamental rights. Furthermore, as long as the district court upholds the admissibility of 
the state's evidence based upon a theoiy that the defendant cannot assert any right under 
the Fourth Amendment, there is no need for the district court to seriously consider the 
issues of whether or not the search warrant was properly issued and whether or not it 
properly authorized the search of "all persons present during the execution of the search 
warrant." Finally, the consolidation of this case with defendant's pending appeal of the 
probation order entered in the Attempted Burglary case (Case No. 950380-CA) would 
advance the interests of judicial economy inasmuch as the proposed interlocutory appeal and 
Case No. 950380-CA present issues which are nearly identical. Moreover, the proposed 
interlocutory appeal presents facts and circumstances which give dimension to the bare legal 
issues presented by the appeal in Case No. 950380-CA. 
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7. ADVANCEMENT OF TERMINATION OF LITIGATION: Determination 
of the issues presented by the proposed interlocutory appeal will likely dispose of this 
litigation by dismissal or settlement. 
DATED this <- /day June, IS 
Gary W. Pentifl$ton/ 
Attorney for Defendant and Petitioner 
MAILING/DEUVERY CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that I did serve the above document this ^ /day of June, 
1995, by delivering a true copy thereof to Eric Ludlow, Washington County Attorney, 178 
North 200 East, St. George, Utah, and by mailing a true copy thereof to Jan Graham, Utah 
Attorney General, Criminal Appeals Division, 236 State Capitol Bldg., Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114. 
Gary W. Pe: 
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GARY W. PENDLETON (2564) 
Attorney for Defendant 
150 North 200 East, Suite 202 
St George, Utah 84770 
Ph: (801) 628-4411 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
DAX BRANT HAMMER, ; 
Defendant. 
> FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, 
AND ORDER DENYING MOTION 
) TO SUPPRESS 
) Case No. 951500444 
) Judge James L. Shumate 
This matter came on for further hearing following an evidentiary hearing which 
was conducted on defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search of the 
defendant's person which search was conducted on or about April 18,1995. In the course 
of the proceedings on the motion to suppress, defendant has been unable to procure the 
compulsory attendance of one Kelly Moore who has now been identified by law enforcement 
oflScers as an undisclosed informant in the application for the search warrant under which 
the subject search was initiated. There are presently outstanding warrants for Mr. Moore's 
arrest not only in this proceeding but also in at least one criminal proceeding in which he 
is a defendant. 
1 
EKHIAIT "A" 
The court specifically finds that given the information which has come to light 
regarding Mr. Moore's difficulties with law enforcement prior to the application for the 
search warrant, the court is disinclined to rely upon that portion of the search warrant which 
identifies Moore as "a citizen with no motive to fabricate and nothing to gain from providing 
this information." Accordingly, the court is without information by which the reliability of 
this undisclosed informant could be established other than by reference to other information 
in the affidavit. 
However, if the search can be sustained on the basis of the defendant's 
probationary status, it is not necessary for the court to determine whether or not the search 
warrant was properly issued or whether or not it properly authorized the search of "all 
persons present during execution of the search warrant". The court, therefore, considers the 
issue of whether or not the defendant's probationary status rendered him subject to 
warrantless searches by peace officers based upon reasonable suspicion. In concluding that 
it does, the court specifically makes the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant was previously convicted of Attempted Burglary, a third degree 
felony, in Washington County Criminal No. 951500040 FS, and the court, sua sponte. takes 
judicial notice of those prior proceedings. 
2. Defendant was sentenced on the Attempted Burglary conviction on March 
29, 1995, during which proceeding, the district court specifically stated and included as a 
condition of probation that the defendant submit his person, possessions, and residence to 
2 
search at the request of a probation officer at any time and to search by any peace officer 
upon reasonable suspicion. 
3. The judgment, sentence, and order of probation in that case was not signed 
until May 16, 1995. It was entered as part of the court record on May 25, 1995. 
4. Pursuant to that judgment, sentence, and order of probation the defendant 
signed a standard form Probation Agreement on April 10, 1995, which agreement includes 
the following language: 
6. SEARCHES: I will permit Agents of Adult Probation and Parole to search 
my PERSON, RESIDENCE, VEHICLE or any other property under my 
control, without a warrant, at any time, day or night, upon reasonable 
suspicion to ensure compliance with the conditions of my Probation 
Agreement. 
That agreement also contains the following language which is typed in 
as part of paragraph 11 ("SPECIAL CONDmONS"): "D. Submit to 
random tests of breath and bodily fluids, and random searches of 
person and property." 
5. The subject search was conducted by peace officers on April 18, 1995. 
6. Probation officers were not involved in conducting the search and did not 
request that the search be conducted 
7. Even if the circumstances involving Mr. Moore's difficulties with the law are 
factored into the equation, the affidavit for the search warrant, a copy of which is attached 
hereto, is sufficient to and does establish "reasonable suspicion" on the part of law 
enforcement officers to believe that Mr. Hammer, by virtue of his presence on the subject 
premises, was in possession of controlled substances, specifically methamphetamine. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court makes upon the following: 
3 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The defendant was under the jurisdiction of the Fifth Judicial District Court, 
Washington County. 
2. The condition of his probation requiring the defendant submit his person 
and residence to search by peace officers upon reasonable suspicion is a valid and 
enforceable term of the defendant's probation. 
3. The defendant was required to submit to the subject search as there was 
reasonable suspicion to support the search. 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that 
defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence obtained in the search of the defendant's 
person is overruled and denied on the basis that the defendant was subject to warrantless 
search conducted by peace officers upon reasonable suspicion. 
DATED this Z 3 day of \jujt^ 
J^ m s^ L.Sh 
District Judge 
Apj^oved as to form and content 
/'A11 E%tti#/T fi to** 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
IN THE MATTER OF A 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 
) AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
SEARCH WARRANT 
Criminal No. 
) 
ss. 
) 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
The Affiapt undersigned, Mike Reynolds, appearing personally 
before me and having been sworn, states on oath: 
(1) That I am employed by the St. George City Police 
Department as~S law enforcement officer, and I am assigned to 
investigate narcotics violations in Washington County. 
(2) The items for which a search warrant is sought are 
described as follows: One 10 inch radial arm saw and stand, and 
one 100 foot power cord bank. Also methamphetamine, and drug 
paraphernalia (see exhibit C)• 
(3) These items are believed to be located at or in: 
residence located at 1185 North Santa Clara Parkway, Santa Clara, 
Utah, including all outbuildings, all vehicles on the premises, 
as well as all persons present during execution of the search 
warrant. 
(4) The grounds for issuing a search warrant are as 
follows: 
a. On April 18, 1995, I received information from Santa 
Clara City Marshall Ken Campbell that on April 17, 1995, he 
E*#fBIT "flu£o*JT 
received information from a confidential informant that at about 
5:00 that morning, Patrick Sparrow and Eric Fox had stolen a saw 
and power cord, and traded them to Ray Adams for an eight ball of 
methamphetamine. The informant stated that he received this 
information from one of the individuals involved in the theft. 
The informant is a citizen with no motive to fabricate and 
nothing to gain from providing this information. 
b. Marshall Campbell was also advised on April 17, by 
Robert Loris, that a ten inch radial arm saw and stand, and a 100 
foot power cord bank belonging to Mr. Loris had been stolen from 
a house Mr. Loris is building at 3520 Chalet Drive, in Santa 
Clara. 
c. The informant also advised Marshall Campbeil that he 
observed a white pickup truck at the job site early in the 
morning on April 17, 1995. 
d. On April 18, 1995, I interviewed Patrick Sparrow, after 
first advising him of his Miranda rights. Mr. Sparrow stated 
that he was at 3520 Chalet Drive, in Santa Clara, picking"up 
scrap lumber in the early morning hours of April 17, and he 
observed the above-described saw. Mr. Sparrow stated that he was 
driving a white pickup truck. 
e. Mr. Sparrow further advised your affiant that the above-
described saw is at the residence of Ray Adams, 1185 North Santa 
Clara Parkway, Santa Clara, Utah. 
f. Mr. Sparrow also stated that he used methamphetamine at 
Ray Adams1 residence in the early morning hours of April 17. Mr. 
2 
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Sparrow stated that he purchased one quarter gram of 
methamphetamine from an individual named "Rocky" at the 
residence. 
g. Mr. Sparrow stated that "Rocky" is often at the 
residence, as well as a female named "Darcy,11 unknown last name, 
who Mr. Sparrow believes has been in trouble in the past for drug 
use. Your affiant is aware of individuals by the names of Rocky 
and Darcy who are involved in the drug culture in St. George. 
h. In March, 1995, a confidential informant who has proved 
to be reliable previously, told your affiant that Ray Adams was 
distributing very large quantities of methamphetamine and 
marijuana in the Washington County area, and that the informant 
had seen methamphetamine in the residence during the month of 
March. The informant also observed individuals at the residence 
using methamphetamine. The informant knew of a large quantity of 
methamphetamine that was being delivered to Ray Adams during the 
first week of March. 
i. During the last part of February, 1995, your affiant was 
contacted by a different confidential informant who advised that 
he/she could purchase drugs from Ray Adams, and had purchased 
drugs from Ray Adams in the past. This individual stated that 
Ray Adams would drive his vehicle to the Dutchman's Market in 
Santa Clara and sell the drugs from his vehicle • 
(5) Your affiant has probable cause to believe, and does 
believe, that the above-described evidence will be located at or 
in the above-described location, and that it could be easily 
3 
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removed, concealed, damaged or destroyed, and asks for authority 
to search without notice. 
(6) Your affiant believes the foregoing information 
constitutes probable cause to support a search of the garage at 
the above residence, and seizure of the above-described evidence, 
Dated tfie-K Time JZllMCS* 
Affiant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this /o day of April, 
1995 
DISTRICP^COURT JUDGED 
EXHIBIT "fl* &»sr 
ITEMS TO SEIZED 
SEARCH WARRANT/AFFIDAVIT 
CONTINUED 
ATTACHMENT "C" 
!• Methamphetamine, a crystalline white or yellowish powder 
solid or rock form, a controlled substance. 
2. Packaging material, to include, but not limited to scales, 
plastic bags, tape, paper bindles cut into squares or tin 
foil sections. 
3. Drug paraphernalia to include but not limited to syringes, 
bent spoon, cotton balls, mirrors, razor blades, straws, 
pipes, glassware used to produce "crank" a form of 
methamphetamine and of any cut material or precursor 
chemical. 
4. Residency papers to Include, but not limited to utility 
receipts and or bills, rental/lease agreements and articles 
showing occupancy of the premises on ownership of premises 
or automobiles. 
5. U.S. Currency believed to be in close proximity to the 
narcotics or produced from the sale of narcotics being 
searched for. 
6. Narcotic recordation, to include but not limited to price 
list, amounts sold, times, dates, amounts purchased, and 
especially drug indebtness. 
7. Telephonic equipment to include but not limited to cordless 
phones, mobile phones, audio or digital pager devices used 
to communicate for the purpose of a related unlawful 
activity. 
EXHIBIT "/)" COPT* 
In the Fifth Judicial District Court of Washington County 
State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs 
HAMMER, DAX BRANT, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant, 
Minute Entry 
Case No. 951500444 FS 
Judge/Comm'r: JAMES L. SHUMATE 
Reporter: 
Tape: 950271; 950272 
1 Count: 364-3466; 2261-3384 
Clerk: ghm 
Date: May 18, 1995 
(364) 
This matter is before District Judge James L. Shumate on May 18, 1995 at 9:00 a.m. 
for suppression hearing. Mr. Eric A Ludlow is the prosecutor for the State and Mr. Gary 
W. Pendleton is pro bono defense counsel. 
Mr. Pendleton makes a statement in reference to motion to quash the warrant and 
evidence as well. 
DW#1 Marshal Kenneth Campbell is called, sworn and examined regarding 
investigation of a theft, ExD-2 affidavit in support of search warrant, credibility of 
informant; informant's drug transaction with Rocky Sand at the Adam's residence. 
(412-1572) 
The signed and served subpoena for Kelly Moore is discussed as well as his telephone 
call to the clerk's office informing that he would not be present as he has separated ribs. 
Judge Shumate makes a record in reference to affidavit #1 for the search warrant, 
(1160) 
Mr. Pendleton makes a statement in reference to calling Mr. Ludlow and reason for 
it. Mr. Ludlow proffers that he has had no discussions with Moore regarding leniency. Mr. 
Pendleton motions to recess and subpoena Mr. Paul Dame from county attorney's office. 
(1581-1780) 
P*HiAiT "%" 
page two 
Criminal No. 951500444 FS 
Judge Shumate makes statement in reference to judicial notice regarding Hammer's 
previous case and waiver of fourth amendment rights to search & seizure, warrant for search 
reference to paragraph #3. 
DW#2 Mike Reynolds s called, sworn and examined regarding being the affiant in the 
search warrant, Moore's motive to be an informant. 
(2194-2604) 
(2605) Judge Shumate's statement for the record regarding motivation of informant's 
and defense counsel states case law. 
DW#1 Kenneth Campbell is recalled for clarification of the record regarding whether 
Moore had discussion with county attorney on April 18, 1995 and if whether or not special 
consideration for being an informant, (negative) rests. 
(3149) Mr. Pendleton further argues his position. 
Recess is called and court will reconvene at 2:30 p.m. (3466) 
Em BIT "g" 0o»T< 
page three 
Criminal No. 951500444 FS 
Tape: 950272 Count: 2261 
Court is back in session all parties are present. 
(2280) DW#2 Mike Reynolds retakes the stand and is re-direct 
examined in reference to all three of the confidential 
informants, execution of the search warrant. Rests 
(2750) The court makes a record in reference to Kelly Moore 
having been served with subpoena, there being no appearance for 
court today, telephone call to the court. Recess was called this 
a.m. and the court authorized issuance of order to show cause at 
10:30 a.m. supported by a bench warrant with bail set in the 
amount of $1,000.00. Copy given to defense counsel and the 
problems with sheriff's department for service of the warrant. 
(3133) Mr. Pendleton further argues theory in reference to 
waiver of fourth amendment applies to the probation office only 
and the validity of the warrant in this case. 
The balance of the hearing to suppress is continued and 
notice setting shall be sent. 
(3384) Recess 
Eim&nr /•'£"dour, 
IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT - St. George COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAX BRANT HAMMER, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY - NOTICE 
Date: MAY 26, 1995 
Case No: 951500444 FS 
Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE 
Clerk: KLH 
Tape: 950300 Count: 300 
HEARING 
This case is before the court for SUPPRESSION HEARING on the 
charges of 
(1) POSS OF A C/S (Second Degree Felony) 
Appearing for the State is ERIC A LUDLOW. The defendant is 
present. Appearing as counsel for the defendant is GARY W PENDLETON. 
C-300 Court explained confidential informant is not available today 
for testimony. C-350 Mr. Pendleton put forth factual basis of 
confidential informant's credability. Mr. Pendleton stated that 
law enforcement was clearly in possession of evidence which magistrate 
should have had in issuing the warrant. Defense still bears burden 
of proof at this time and it does not shift back to the State. C-1000 
Mr. Pendleton gave circumstances of theft of saw and involvement of 
participants. C-1585 Mr. Pendleton stated there was no probable cause 
to establish basis of issuance of search warrant, c-2603 Court 
EXHIBIT "BuCoArr. 
Case Number: 951500444 FS 
responded with concern about defendant Hammer. Defendant was searched 
under two different assumptions. Warrant may not have been valid but 
was for purpose of searching location and also persons at location. 
Because defendant was on probation did police officer have right to 
search him independent of the warrant? • C-3265 Court is not inclined 
to grant or deny motion to suppress at this time. Reluctance is due 
to difference between this defendant and case quoted by Mr. Pendleton. 
Mr. Hammer had a diminished right to privacy through 4th amendment 
because of his probationary status. Court needs to see more case law 
on probation restrictions. Confidential informant is definitely in 
gray area. Defendant is unique case to this court. Court defended 
officers as acting in good faith. Court needs to look at warrant as a whole 
and not as bifurcated document. C-3977 Court continued for review hearing on 
May 31, 1995 at 1:30 p.m. 
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IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT - St. George COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAX BRANT HAMMER, 
Defendant, 
(Jail) 
MINUTE ENTRY - NOTICE 
Date: MAY 31, 1995 
Case No: 951500444 FS 
Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE 
Clerk: VPF 
Tape: 950302 Count: 2721 
HEARING 
This case is before the court for REVIEW HEARING on the charges 
of 
(1) POSS OF A C/S (Second Degree Felony) 
Appearing for the State is ERIC A LUDLOW. The defendant is 
present. Appearing as counsel for the defendant is GARY W PENDLETON. 
(2721) This case is before Judge James L. Shumate for a review hear-
ing having been continued from 05-26-95. Mr. Pendleton submits furthe 
case rulings from other states regarding probation agreements and 
renews his argument that the search was illegal as the probation 
order was not signed by the Court until 05-16-95 and not entered into 
the Court record until 05-25-95. 
The Court finds that at the time Defendant Hammer was under the verbal 
order of the probation agreement and was in the residence at the time 
of the search. The Court does not authorize the search warrant but is 
Eww •<8"&>W' 
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relying on the verbal probation order. The Court also finds that 
Officer Reynolds had reasonable suspicion that Defendant Hammer was 
using drugs and was under the search and seizure rule at the time. 
The Court denies the motion to suppress. 
The court orders that the defendant be remanded to the custody of 
the County Sheriff. 
Emerr "&''&*#. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS, 
—- oo Oo o— — 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v* 
Dax Brant Hammer, 
Defendant and Petitioner. 
FILED 
ORDER 
Case NO. 950437-CA 
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Jackson (Lav 6 Motion). 
This natter is before the court on a petition for permission 
to appeal an interlocutory order. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is denied. 
Dated this 31st day of July, 1995. 
JTidith M. Billings, Judge 
Normal H* Jackson, pledge 
